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INTRODUCTION 
 central tenet of the American justice system, as embodied in the 
fundamental idea of stare decisis, is predictability. The 
knowledge that a decisionmaker, when confronted with similar facts, 
will decide the present case in the same way as the last allows parties 
to better navigate the legal system
1
 and channel their behavior.
2
 
Though conflict of laws scholars have struggled to persuade judges 
that choice-of-law methodologies should matter as much as 
substantive law,
3
 the ability to predict which law will govern a 
dispute is just as important for avoiding uncertainty in litigation. 
When the choice between two available bodies of law will affect the 
ultimate disposition of a case, the process for arriving at that choice 
becomes even more critical.
4
 
The proposition that so-called “outcome-determinative” choice-of-
law determinations are significant to our legal system is supported by 
the widespread teaching of the Erie doctrine.
5
 Although civil suits 
based on diversity jurisdiction make up only a fraction of the cases 
that appear in federal court,
6
 first-year law students are consistently 
made to learn the framework for choosing between state and federal 
law under those circumstances. In contrast, the law school curriculum 
gives students little exposure to Erie’s state court counterpart, 
affectionately termed “reverse-Erie.”
7
 
 
1 Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597 (1987). 
2 Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1151 (2000). 
3 Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 949, 951–52 (1994). 
4 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (holding that procedural 
rules that create an outcome not “substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a 
[different] court,” should be treated the same as substantive laws under the Erie doctrine). 
See discussion infra Part I.A.1. 
5 See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 50 & n.198 (2006) 
(discussing the coverage of the Erie doctrine across Civil Procedure courses). 
6 For the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2011, diversity suits (101,508) made up 
28 percent of the total cases (368,394) filed in United States district courts. OFFICE OF 
JUDGES PROGRAMS STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL 
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: JUNE 30, 2011, at 29, 45 (2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/June2011 
.aspx. 
7 For a discussion of reverse-Erie coverage in American law schools, see Clermont, 
supra note 5, at 51–54. Clermont opines that reverse-Erie is given scant treatment in civil 
procedure courses due either to national law schools’ focus on federal law or to the 
mistaken belief that reverse-Erie will be covered in federal jurisdiction courses or in 
constitutional law as part and parcel of the preemption doctrine. Id. at 51–53. 
A 
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From its name alone, one might expect reverse-Erie determinations 
to follow an established Erie-like framework.
8
 In accordance with 
Erie case law, one might also expect the majority of cases involving 
borderline substantive-procedural questions to result in application of 
the law of the forum (i.e., federal rules in federal courts and state rules 
in state courts).
9
 Reverse-Erie’s close relation to preemption would 
also support such an inference because preemption analysis begins 
with a presumption against preemption—that is, in favor of state 
law.
10
 
In practice, however, reverse-Erie is not merely an analog of the 
Erie doctrine, nor is it a subsection of preemption;
11
 reverse-Erie 
differs from those doctrines in that the ultimate choice of law is 
unpredictable. The inartful “balancing” of state and federal interests 
in reverse-Erie cases—as opposed to the use of an Erie-like 
framework—often results in the application of federal law
12
 without 
meaningful explanation to help parties understand how their choice-
of-law issues will be decided in the future. And while federal 
supremacy is not without its place in the overall choice-of-law 
methodology, it is misplaced in the reverse-Erie analysis. 
Part I of this Comment describes the framework that the Supreme 
Court has supplied for deciding the applicability of state and federal 
rules in the contexts of Erie, preemption, and reverse-Erie. Part II 
explores the lopsided results achieved under the current reverse-Erie 
paradigm and proposes an explanation for the apparent bias towards 
the federal sovereign: premature considerations of preemption come 
into play when state courts decide whether the rule they are 
 
8 But see id. at 13 (arguing that there is little agreement about what is the proper 
methodology for determining Erie problems); Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine 
Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1235, 1255–63 (1999) (describing four different methodologies for choosing between state 
and federal law). 
9 Of the five Erie cases heard by the Supreme Court after Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), only one has resulted in the application of state law. See 
York, 326 U.S. 99; see also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 
537–38 (1958) (suggesting that when court functions would be disrupted otherwise, the 
rule of the forum should be favored). 
10 E.g., Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and 
Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (1998). 
11 Clermont, supra note 5, at 8. 
12 Id. at 38 (“[R]everse-Erie is a more intrusive doctrine in terms of results realized in 
the real world: in that middle area between state and federal substantive law, state courts 
must apply federal procedural law to federally created claims more extensively than 
federal courts must apply state procedural law to state-created claims.”). 
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examining is substantive or procedural.
13
 After proposing a new 
framework for choosing the applicable body of law, one that more 
closely resembles a mirror image of the Erie framework, this 
Comment looks to decisions in Indian law to illustrate the problems 
produced by the current reverse-Erie paradigm and how they might be 
cured under the proposed framework. The tension between state and 
federal law is made all the more obvious when a third sovereign, a 
tribal nation, is thrown into the mix. While a choice-of-law 
methodology that produces predictable results better serves all 
litigants, its benefits become particularly clear when it affects a group 
that been historically disadvantaged in accessing the American justice 
system. 
I 
THE DOCTRINES 
For those who have forgotten the days of civil procedure or have 
foregone the doctrines entirely, the following section contains basic 
overviews of Erie, preemption, and reverse-Erie. While experts 
disagree about the proper application of these doctrines,
14
 they 
generally agree about the aim: to settle disputes over application of 
federal versus state law while limiting interference with each 
sovereign’s interests.
15
 Implicated in these determinations are notions 
of federalism and comity, leaving each court system free to fashion its 
own rules of practice and procedure, but requiring it to apply the 
substantive law of the sovereign whose cause of action is being 
adjudicated. The decision is more difficult, however, when the rule at 
issue is not so easily categorized. The landmark Supreme Court cases 
discussed below serve as guidance for determining whether those 
borderline rules should be treated as substantive or procedural. 
A. State Law in Federal Court 
The Constitution delegates to the several states the authority to 
make the substantive law enforced within their own borders.
16
 In 
overruling almost a century of federal jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court held in its 1938 Erie decision that a federal court applying its 
own notions of “general” law to a diversity case amounted to an 
 
13 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
14 See supra note 8. 
15 See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 5, at 14. 
16 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938). 
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unconstitutional invasion of that authority.
17
 In a seemingly 
unsympathetic opinion that left the wounded plaintiff without 
redress,
18
 the Court stressed its intent to cure a more generalized 
harm: the danger of forum shopping and discriminatory application of 
the laws.
19
 Erie clarified that the Rules of Decision Act’s directive to 
federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state substantive law was 
binding whether that law was statutory or judge-made. What was not 
clear, however, was to what extent federal courts were bound by state 
rules of practice and procedure. 
1. Erie Under the Rules of Decision Act 
Subsequent Erie cases made clear that seemingly procedural state 
rules should be treated as substantive if they would produce a 
different result in federal court than if the same claim had been 
adjudicated in state court. In York, the Supreme Court considered 
whether a federal court sitting in diversity was required to apply the 
same statute of limitations applicable to an equity action in state 
court.
20
 Without categorizing statutes of limitation as either 
substantive or procedural, the court noted that “a statute that would 
completely bar recovery in a suit if brought in a State court bears on a 
State-created [sic] right vitally and not merely formally or 
negligibly.”
21
 As such, rules that would produce a substantially 
 
17 Id. at 79–80. 
18 CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES relates the tragic factual background behind the Erie 
decision: the plaintiff, Tompkins, was a twenty-seven year old laborer who had recently 
lost his job, like so many others suffering through the Great Depression, at the local stove 
works. One evening, while returning from a visit to his sick mother-in-law, Tompkins was 
struck by the door of a passing train as he walked along the well-tread foot path next to the 
tracks. Tompkins awoke hours later in a hospital bed to find that his right arm had been 
amputated, exacerbating his struggle to pay his family’s already accruing bills. Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics and Social Change 
Reshape the Law, Clermont, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21, 35–39, 63–64 (Kevin M. 
Clermont ed., 2004). Under the prevailing state precedent, Tompkins was classified as a 
trespasser and therefore was not entitled to compensation by the railroad unless he could 
prove that they had acted with recklessness or wanton disregard. Tompkins’ lawyers 
brought the claim in federal court, hoping to capitalize on the Swift doctrine’s grant of 
authority to federal judges to draw from “general principles.” Erie, 304 U.S. at 70, 84. 
Whatever legal scholars may conceive of Erie, it represented an unpredictable and 
unfortunate result for Tompkins, who was then left to the harshness of the state common 
law. 
19 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–78 (citing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)). 
20 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109–10 (1945). 
21 Id. at 110. 
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different outcome in federal court should be treated as substantive.
22
 
York’s holding was later eroded by Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric 
Cooperative, Inc.,
23
 but the Supreme Court revived the outcome-
determinative test in Hanna v. Plumer, qualifying that “outcome-
determinative” must be viewed in reference to “the twin aims of the 
Erie rule: discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of 
inequitable administration of the laws.”
24
 
However, even outcome-determinative rules that would promote 
forum shopping or result in discriminatory application of substantive 
law must pass the Supreme Court’s mandated balancing test. In Byrd, 
the Court added a requirement for the lower courts to balance 
“countervailing considerations” of strong federal interests against “the 
objective that . . . litigation should not come out one way in the 
federal court and another way in the state court.”
25
 In that case, a 
South Carolina rule granting judges the authority to rule on immunity 
defenses was outcome-determinative in a York-sense.
26
 However, the 
Supreme Court held that the state’s interest in uniform adjudication of 
its workmen’s compensation claims was subordinate to the federal 
interest in protecting the Seventh Amendment’s allocation of 
functions between judge and jury.
27
 In Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities, Inc., the Court then announced that both sovereigns’ 
interests should be simultaneously accommodated whenever 
possible—in that case, doing so by imposing the state’s standard of 
review for damage awards at the trial level while maintaining the 
federal standard of review at the appellate level.
28
 
2. Erie Under the Rules Enabling Act 
Federal interests are presumed to be particularly strong where 
Congress, through the Rules Enabling Act, has authorized federal 
courts to operate under their own rules of procedure. In Hanna v. 
Plumer, the Court was faced with deciding between a state law and a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
29
 If the Federal Rule was in “direct 
 
22 Id. 
23 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958). 
24 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
25 356 U.S. at 537–38. 
26 Id. at 536–37. 
27 Id. at 537–38. 
28 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437–39 (1996). It remains to be 
seen how Gasperini will affect future Erie analyses, however, as the accommodation 
principle has only been applied within the realm of remittitur and jury awards. 
29 380 U.S. at 461. 
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conflict” with the state law, the Court effectively mandated a 
presumption in favor of the Federal Rule for two reasons: first, its 
enactment evidenced a strong federal interest; second, the Rules 
Enabling Act, which authorized Congress to enact the Federal Rules, 
was not at odds with the Rules of Decision Act relied upon in Erie to 
vindicate state courts’ right to “make” law.
30
 In the latest Erie case 
before the Supreme Court, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. 
v. Allstate Insurance Co., the plurality opinion reaffirmed a 
presumption in favor of the Federal Rules.
31
 
This presumption in favor of the Federal Rules can be rebutted, 
however, when the Rule does not “really regulate[] procedure” but 
rather functions as substantive law.
32
 In his concurrence to Shady 
Grove, Justice Stevens recognized a limit on application of the 
Federal Rules: when the procedural rule “is so intertwined with a state 
right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-
created right.”
33
 Though no Federal Rule to date has been struck 
down under this hurdle of Erie, Stevens’ directive
34
 functions as a 
Byrd-like balancing test that contemplates the states’ constitutionally-
granted right to create their own substantive laws. 
The resulting Erie framework features two routes for vertical 
choice-of-law determinations in diversity actions. In the first, arising 
under the Rules Enabling Act, the court should consider whether the 
relevant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure directly conflicts with the 
state procedural rule. In the second, arising under the Rules of 
Decision Act, a federal court must inquire whether application of the 
federal law is outcome-determinative within the meaning of Erie’s 
twin aims and whether there are any countervailing considerations 
indicating a strong federal interest in favor of application of the 
federal law. 
 
 
 
 
30 See id. at 471–74. 
31 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010). 
32 See id. at 1452–53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
33 Id. at 1452. 
34 When a case results in a plurality decision, “the holding of the Court may be viewed 
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion). Thus, the 
test articulated in Stevens’ concurrence should govern in future Erie situations. 
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FIGURE 1. Erie Doctrine 
 
B. Federal Procedure in State Court 
Like a mirror-image of Erie, the reverse-Erie doctrine comes into 
play when parties choose to litigate a federal cause of action in state 
court. The question then becomes whether the court should displace 
state law in favor of existing federal law in hearing such claims. The 
answer is simple if the Constitution or Congress has explicitly made 
federal law applicable.
35
 In the absence of such a directive, courts 
look to congressional intent to implicitly preempt state law as well as 
“a federally mandated judicial choice-of-law methodology similar to  
. . . Erie.”
36
 
1. Preemption for Beginners 
Courts and scholars often phrase their reverse-Erie analysis under 
the paradigm of implied preemption.
37
 In two of the four landmark 
 
35 Clermont, supra note 5, at 20. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State 
Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1784–86 (1992). A state law 
may also be preempted under the theory of field preemption if “[t]he scheme of federal 
regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room 
for the States to supplement it.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947). While field preemption is not relevant to the analysis herein, it is worth 
mentioning that field preemption and conflict preemption occasionally overlap when the 
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VAN WIEREN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/4/2012  2:17 PM 
2012] The Silent Sovereign: Tipping the Scales 305 
in Reverse-Erie Applications of Indian Law 
reverse-Erie cases, even the Supreme Court phrased its analysis in 
terms of preemption.
38
 While the two methods are closely related—
both involving a choice between federal and state law—the reasoning 
behind these choices, as well as their consequences, differs. 
First, it is appropriate to designate a state law as “preempted” in 
only two situations: when federal law contains an explicit preemption 
clause or when the relevant state law actually conflicts.
39
 Assuming 
that Congress has not expressly preempted state law, preemption 
analysis begins with a presumption against preemption—that is, in 
favor of state law.
40
 To overcome this presumption, the court must 
find a conflict between the state and federal law. Such a conflict 
exists only if “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a 
physical impossibility”
41
 or if state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”
42
 Where state and federal law contradict each other, the 
Supremacy Clause compels the judiciary to apply federal law.
43
 
Of all the preemption doctrines, so-called “obstacle preemption” is 
perhaps the most controversial. Under traditional conflict preemption, 
courts can rationally displace state law by imputing to Congress an 
intent to protect federal law from being nullified and “the policies and 
purposes reflected in its enactments undermined by the application of 
state law”;
44
 by comparison, the basis for obstacle preemption can 
 
federal interest, like that of immigration, is so dominant that the federal system will be 
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. See Viet D. Dinh, 
Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2098–99 (2000) (citing Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)) (“[A]lthough . . . Hines v. Davidowitz . . . is cited as the 
classic articulation of obstacle preemption, Hines may be better understood as a field 
preemption case because the opinion relied on the uniquely national nature of regulating 
aliens to hold that state laws on the same subject are displaced.” (citations omitted)). 
38 See infra Part II.B.2. 
39 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 (2000) (citing English v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)). 
40 E.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918 (1997); Jordan, supra note 10; Federal 
laws, 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 55 (2009). 
41 Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). But cf. 
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities. Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (requiring that state and federal 
interests be accommodated simultaneously whenever possible under the Erie doctrine). 
42 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; Nelson, supra note 39, at 228. 
43 “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, 
cl. 2. 
44 Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 
740 (2008). 
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appear to be vague and farfetched.
45
 Because courts extend the typical 
notion of conflict preemption to “cases in which courts think that the 
effects of state law will hinder accomplishment of the purposes 
behind federal law,”
46
 obstacle preemption seems to leave room for 
judges’ subjective ideas of fairness within the analytical framework. 
Displacing state law under such circumstances conflicts not only with 
federalism but also with separation of powers ideals. 
Instead, the Supreme Court has mandated that the judiciary’s role 
in preemption is limited to ferreting out congressional intent.
47
 Before 
declaring that a state law stands as an “obstacle” to the purposes of 
Congress, the court must first identify Congress’s objectives.
48
 
Determining the presence of an actual conflict often entails 
consideration of whether Congress intended to set exclusive standards 
or merely minimum standards—a floor on which the states may 
impose more stringent controls.
49
 Under obstacle preemption, even 
after identifying the indicia of congressional intent, courts risk leaving 
the impression that such identification is merely a pretext for 
individual judges’ preferences.
50
 
Lastly, the consequences of preemption should warn courts to take 
care in their analyses. Due to the implication of the Supremacy 
 
45 See id. at 739 (noting that the tension between state and federal law is “sharper” 
under conflict preemption than obstacle preemption); Nelson, supra note 39, at 228–29 
(stating that the second test is broader, leading many to question whether the current 
approach “risk[s] displacing too much state law”). 
46 Nelson, supra note 39, at 228–29. 
47 Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (“In determining 
whether a state statute is pre-empted [sic] by federal law and therefore invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, [the court’s] sole task is to ascertain the intent of 
Congress.”); see also Clermont, supra note 5, at 7 & n.27 (citing Nelson, supra note 39, at 
226). But see Dinh, supra note 37, at 2099 (“The fact that displacement by federal 
common law and the dormant Commerce Clause are on this spectrum—that state laws can 
be preempted without any congressional action—suggests it is not entirely correct to state 
that ‘“[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” in every preemption case.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)). 
48 Jamelle C. Sharpe, Toward (a) Faithful Agency in the Supreme Court’s Preemption 
Jurisprudence, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 367, 387 (2011). 
49 See, e.g., Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285 (finding a California law that granted a right to 
reinstatement to pregnant women was not preempted because “Congress intended the 
[Pregnancy Discrimination Act] to be ‘a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits 
may not drop—not a ceiling above which they may not rise’”). 
50 Sharpe, supra note 48; see also Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 163, 178 (“When the Court or administrative agencies face preemption 
questions, they are therefore left to piece together Congress’s intent from available 
evidence or, as is more often the case, fill in the gaps with their own views on federalism, 
corrective justice, and regulatory efficiency.”). 
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Clause, a finding that a state procedural rule is preempted invalidates 
that rule in all future cases, not just similar reverse-Erie situations 
involving the same federal cause of action.
51
 Thus, an erroneous 
determination that a state law is “preempted” can have dangerous 
consequences, both for the future application of that law and for 
parties’ ability to predict the outcome of future reverse-Erie inquiries. 
2. Introduction to Reverse-Erie 
The true reverse-Erie situation is one in which the relevant state 
and federal laws do not conflict, but rather must be selected to favor 
“the law of the sovereign whose functions would be more impaired by 
nonapplication.”
52
 Because of preemption and the obvious influence 
of the Supremacy Clause when state and federal laws do conflict, the 
analog of the Rules Enabling Act route to Erie analysis should not be 
at issue in reverse-Erie cases.
53
 What is left, essentially, is the mirror-
image of Erie’s Rules of Decision Act route: a balancing test. Though 
the current framework is unsettled, the four landmark cases discussed 
below are instructive for deciphering the Supreme Court’s approach 
to reverse-Erie. 
Much like Erie’s outcome-determinative inquiry, reverse-Erie 
dictates that seemingly procedural rules should be treated as 
substantive if they affect the ultimate disposition of the case.
54
 In a 
strikingly York-like opinion, the Supreme Court struck down a strict 
Georgia pleading standard in Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama 
because it completely barred recovery that would have been available 
to the plaintiff if he had brought his Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
(FELA) claim in federal court.
55
 At the trial level, the court sustained 
the defendant’s demurrer, finding that the complaint did not set forth 
a cause of action, and dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a Georgia 
law making dismissal a final adjudication barring recovery in any 
future proceeding.
56
 Noting that the state courts were usually “free to 
follow their own rules of ‘practice’ and ‘procedure,’” the Supreme 
Court held that the federal pleading standard was applicable to ensure 
 
51 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 55 (2009). 
52 Clermont, supra note 5, at 14. 
53 Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 
(2010) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1999)). 
54 Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 921 (1997). 
55 Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 294, 299 (1949). 
56 Id. at 295. 
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“uniform application of the federal act in the state and federal 
courts.”
57
 The Court reaffirmed the outcome-determinative test in 
Felder v. Casey, displacing Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute under 
a theory of obstacle preemption, but citing as its reasoning that 
enforcement would “frequently and predictably produce different 
outcomes in § 1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim [was] 
asserted in state or federal court.”
58
 
The Supreme Court will also treat as substantive any rule that is so 
intertwined with a federal substantive right that it functions to define 
the scope of that right.
59
 Though Felder has been cited as the source 
of the outcome-determinative test discussed above,
60
 the notice-of-
claim statute at issue in that case was arguably not outcome-
determinative in the York- or Brown-sense because the provision 
encouraging pre-suit settlement
61
 would not affect the ultimate 
disposition of the case
62
—parties amenable to suit could opt to settle 
at any point in the proceedings, and had the governmental agency 
been unwilling to settle for the requested amount, the complaint 
would have proceeded in exactly the way it did in Felder. Rather, 
what was more critical to the Court’s analysis was that the state’s 
notice-of-claim statute effectively conferred an additional affirmative 
defense on the governmental defendants, thereby “‘defining and 
characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.’”
63
 
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co. also resulted in 
application of federal law where the Court determined that the jury’s 
resolution of factual issues was “too substantial a part of the rights 
accorded by the [Federal Employers’ Liability] Act” to be dismissed 
as merely procedural.
64
 
Lastly, the Court has mandated a balancing test for rules deemed 
substantive under either of the foregoing tests. In Felder, the Court 
 
57 Id. at 295–96. 
58 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). 
59 Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1452 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
60 See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 921 (1997). 
61 The notice of claim statute required the party seeking redress to submit an itemized 
statement of the relief sought and gave the recipient agency 120 days to grant or disallow 
the requested relief. Felder, 487 U.S. at 137 (citing WIS. STAT. § 893.80(1)(a)–(b) (1983 
& Supp. 1987)). 
62 See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 921 (“‘[O]utcome,’ as we used the term [in Felder], 
referred to the ultimate disposition of the case.”). 
63 Felder, 487 U.S. at 144 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985)). 
64 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R, Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952). 
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weighed the state’s primary interest in enforcing the notice of claim 
statute (to minimize liability and the expenses associated with it) 
against the federal interest in assuring that a plaintiff’s ability to 
recover for civil rights violations was not hindered by rules that 
favored the same agencies responsible for those violations.
65
 Even the 
state’s less nefarious secondary interest in prescribing prompt 
corrective measures was deemed subordinate to federal interests.
66
 
Conversely, strong state interests can function as Byrd-like 
countervailing considerations. In Johnson, to determine whether the 
state’s finality rule barred defendant’s interlocutory appeal on the 
issue of qualified immunity,
67
 the Court balanced the interference 
with federal interests
68
 against competing state interests in limiting 
interlocutory appeals.
69
 Noting that the state’s final judgment rule did 
not discriminate against the federal right since it applied equally to 
state personal injury actions,
70
 the Court determined that the 
application of the state rule was appropriate because the state’s 
interest in the operation of its courts outweighed the defendant-
officials’ interest in avoiding the burdens of litigation.
71
 
In the wake of these cases, the resulting methodology seems to 
embrace many Erie-like qualities. Resembling Erie’s Rules Enabling 
Act route, preemption analysis takes hold first, resulting in 
application of federal law automatically if a direct conflict exists 
between state and federal law. However, Felder compels state courts 
to run rules on the borderline between substance and procedure 
through the filters of both obstacle preemption and reverse-Erie, 
including a Byrd-like test that balances the state’s “countervailing 
considerations” against the federal interests in protecting substantive 
rights and promoting uniform adjudication. 
 
65 Felder, 487 U.S. at 143. 
66 Id. 
67 Johnson, 520 U.S. at 913–14. 
68 Over the plaintiffs’ objections, the Court determined that there was not a strong 
federal interest in the substantive qualified immunity defense because, though rooted in § 
1983, “the ultimate purpose of qualified immunity is to protect the State and its officials 
from overenforcement [sic] of federal rights.” Id. at 919. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 918 n.9; see STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE 
COURTS § 10.6 (1990) (stating that state procedural rules are generally insulated from 
preemption by the adequate state grounds doctrine in § 1983 claims unless those rules 
discriminate against the federal cause). 
71 Johnson, 520 U.S. at 922–23. 
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FIGURE 2. Reverse-Erie Doctrine As-Is 
 
II 
REVERSE-ERIE IN PRACTICE 
The asymmetry with the Erie doctrine becomes evident when 
reverse-Erie is put into practice. The first hurdle for the court is 
recognizing that a reverse-Erie issue exists. Misled by conflicts 
scholars or by the Supreme Court’s wording in Johnson and Felder, 
the court may analyze the issue in terms of preemption, find no direct 
conflict, and give credence to the presumption in favor of state law. 
This error, however, occurs less often and is less intrusive to state 
sovereignty
72
 than the second hurdle to faithful application of reverse-
Erie: federal supremacy. 
Most reverse-Erie cases come out in favor of federal law.
73
 Why? 
Under Erie, in the absence of an on-point Federal Rule, the implicit 
presumption is in favor of federal procedural law. By comparison, 
under reverse-Erie, traditional notions of federalism mandate against 
a presumption of federal law. Given those assertions, one might 
 
72 Clermont, supra note 5, at 38 (stating that state courts end up applying federal law 
more than federal courts apply state law in the grey between substantive and procedural 
law). 
73 Id. at 38–42. 
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expect the majority of reverse-Erie cases to result in application of 
state procedural law. The opposite results cannot be explained away 
citing asymmetries between Erie and reverse-Erie. Instead, an 
unstated favoritism towards the federal sovereign indicates that the 
current reverse-Erie framework is a faulty one, which results in a 
presumption of federal law when the preemption doctrine plays too 
powerful a role. 
A. Asymmetry Between the Doctrines 
If one were to borrow from its Erie doctrine analog, a reasonable 
explanation for the lopsided results achieved under reverse-Erie 
would be to serve “the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of 
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the 
laws.”
74
 In Erie, the Supreme Court announced: 
Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to 
prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not 
citizens of the state. Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination 
by non-citizens against citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the 
unwritten “general law” vary according to whether enforcement was 
sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of 
selecting the court in which the right should be determined was 
conferred upon the non-citizen.
75
 
By virtue of diversity jurisdiction, noncitizen plaintiffs and 
defendants alike have the opportunity to choose between the state and 
federal system—plaintiffs by filing a complaint in the desired court, 
and defendants by exercising their right to remove. Undoubtedly, 
these choices are motivated by whichever system featured law more 
favorable to the party’s cause. A similarly situated party litigating in 
its home state, however, does not enjoy the same choice. A citizen 
plaintiff is virtually powerless to respond once their noncitizen 
opponent removed to federal court.
76
 Likewise, citizen defendants are 
 
74 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468. 
75 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938) (citing Swift v. Tyson, 41 
U.S. 1 (1842)). 
76 Once a defendant has successfully removed an action to federal court, a plaintiff 
seeking to remand the case back to state court faces the difficult and unlikely task of 
proving that the removal was procedurally defective. 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3739 (4th ed. 2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). 
Ostensibly, an in-state plaintiff could avoid such a fate if he joined an in-state defendant, 
thereby destroying diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or by requesting 
damages below § 1332’s amount in controversy requirement. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 
U.S. 267 (1806) (holding that complete diversity—diversity between each plaintiff and 
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subject to the plaintiff’s choice of forum since removal is 
unavailable.
77
 
A prototypical example of this discrimination appears in Black & 
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & 
Transfer Co.
78
 Facing an unfavorable state law, the plaintiff 
corporation dissolved its Kentucky headquarters and reincorporated in 
Tennessee to bring a diversity action.
79
 Following Swift, a six-justice 
majority held that the district court properly applied “general” law 
rather than state precedent.
80
 It was this kind of manipulation of the 
system that the Erie Court had in mind when it overturned Swift, 
opting instead for a system that would promote uniform adjudication 
of the same claim across both court systems. 
However, the danger of “inequitable administration of the law” is 
lessened in reverse-Erie—not by application of federal law, but by the 
fundamental differences in subject-matter jurisdiction between state 
and federal courts. In a reverse-Erie situation, subject-matter 
jurisdiction is conferred upon state courts by virtue of concurrent 
jurisdiction,
81
 leaving any plaintiff, regardless of their citizenship, 
free to bring their claim in either the federal or the state system. 
Defendants likewise have the choice to remove regardless of their 
citizenship, since federal jurisdiction would be founded on the “claim 
or right arising under the . . . laws of the United States.”
82
 Thus, 
Erie’s aim to correct a system that is more favorable to noncitizens 
than citizens is not as well-served by the application of federal law 
under reverse-Erie as by the application of state law under Erie. 
 
each defendant in an action—is required in § 1332 actions). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) 
(2006) (“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder 
would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder . . . .”). In any case, 
such choices are not always available to in-state plaintiffs, leaving them at the mercy of 
the defendant’s choice of forum. 
77 In cases in which federal jurisdiction depends solely on diversity of citizenship of the 
parties, an action is not removable when the defendant is a citizen of the state in which the 
action is brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006). 
78 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 
276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
79 Id. at 523–24. 
80 Id. at 529–31. 
81 While federal jurisdiction is conferred in Erie cases by diversity of citizenship, 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (2006), reverse-Erie cases arise where Congress has granted concurrent 
jurisdiction to state courts to entertain a particular federal cause of action, see, e.g., Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2006). 
82 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
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B. Criticisms of Reverse-Erie As-Is 
In the absence of an alternative explanation, it is this author’s 
humble opinion that a faulty framework is to blame for the irregular 
results achieved under the current reverse-Erie model. Of the four 
landmark cases relied upon to craft the current reverse-Erie 
framework, Felder is the most likely culprit. Without identifying a 
strong federal interest to justify either obstacle preemption or 
favoritism of federal law under a balancing test, Felder is the prime 
example of how federal supremacy can silently bleed into the choice-
of-law methodology. 
Despite the presumption against preemption and the absence of an 
actual conflict, the Court in Felder stretched its preemption analysis 
to displace state law. Finding that “Congress [could not have] 
intended federal courts to apply such rules, which ‘significantly 
inhibit the ability to bring federal actions,’”
83
 the Court pointed to no 
specific indicia of congressional intent.
84
 Rather, the Court identified 
a conflict between the state’s purpose in enacting the notice of claim 
statute—to minimize governmental liability—with the purposes 
behind § 1983’s “uniquely federal” imposition of liability on 
governmental entities.
85
 This superficial treatment of congressional 
intent appears pretextual in light of two considerations. First, 
assuming that the notice of claim statute functioned effectively to 
encourage pre-suit settlement,
86
 what was it about the filing of the 
complaint that was so integral to § 1983? If a victim of a civil rights 
violation gets exactly the remedy he is seeking without ever setting 
foot in a courtroom, the full purposes and objectives of Congress 
cannot possibly be said to be frustrated. Second, it is difficult to 
believe that the notice of claim statute was inconsistent with federal 
interests
87
 when the federal system itself requires prefiling notice of 
complaints.
88
 
 
83 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 140 (1988) (quoting Brown v. United States, 239 F.2d 
1498, 1507 (1984)). 
84 See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
85 Felder, 487 U.S. at 141. 
86 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
87 See Felder, 487 U.S. at 156–57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the notice-of-
claim statute was not inconsistent with Congressional objectives, but instead was 
invalidated by the majority’s “own intuitions about ‘the goals of the federal civil rights 
laws’”). 
88 Exec. Order No. 12988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4,729 (Feb. 5, 1996). 
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The Court’s erroneous finding of preemption in Felder is made 
more confusing by subsequent findings that the notice-of-claim 
statute was outcome-determinative and that federal interests 
outweighed those of the state. Felder blurs the lines between 
preemption and reverse-Erie, but even in doing so, incorrectly 
performs the reverse-Erie tests. While it is difficult to imagine how a 
notice requirement would affect the ultimate disposition of the case,
89
 
it is also difficult to understand how the Court justified its balancing 
test. Articulating only one federal interest—uniform adjudication of § 
1983 claims
90
—the Court nonetheless found that that interest alone 
outweighed those stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court: “the 
[s]tate’s legitimate interests in protecting against stale or fraudulent 
claims, facilitating prompt settlement of valid claims, and identifying 
and correcting inappropriate conduct by governmental employees and 
officials.”
91
 Felder’s treatment of the balancing test is both 
substantively and technically incorrect. First, common sense dictates 
that the state’s interests in Felder are not so easily dismissed in 
comparison to the federal interest in uniformity. Second, for reverse-
Erie to be a true mirror of Erie, the countervailing considerations to 
be balanced should be those of the state, not the federal government.
92
 
The flaws of Felder signal not only that the current reverse-Erie 
framework is faulty, but also that the current framework allows for 
overapplication of federal law. Lower courts faithfully applying 
Felder would field state law first through the filter of preemption;
93
 
but where that test would normally lead to application of state law, 
courts are then compelled to test that law under traditional reverse-
Erie,
94
 thereby exposing the state rule to twice as many opportunities 
for displacement by federal law. This approach effectively invalidates 
the presumption against preemption. To honor this presumption, and 
states’ rights generally, the framework must be reworked. 
 
89 A rule is only outcome-determinative if it would affect the ultimate disposition of the 
case. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
90 Felder, 487 U.S. at 153, 156. 
91 Id. at 137. 
92 Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) (considering 
federal interests in the smooth operation of its courts as a counterpoint to Erie’s outcome-
determinative test). 
93 Janet M. Bowermaster, Two (Federal) Wrongs Make a (State) Right: State Class-
Action Procedures as an Alternative to the Opt-In Class-Action Provision of the ADEA, 25 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 7, 20 (1991) (stating that characterization of a rule as substantive or 
procedural “has tended to come after, or even as a substitute for, striking a proper balance 
between federal and state interests”). 
94  See supra Figure 2. 
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C. Reverse-Erie as It Should Be 
To truly put state interests on equal footing with their federal 
counterparts, federal law should be adjudicated in state court in much 
the same way that state claims proceed in federal court. To cure the 
defects in the current reverse-Erie framework, one need look no 
further than Erie itself. Flipping the Erie framework to produce its 
mirror image sheds some light on where the current reverse-Erie 
framework goes awry: as a parallel of Erie’s Rules Enabling Act 
route, preemption should come second, not first, in the overall 
methodology.
95
 
Running rules through the filter of traditional reverse-Erie first 
ensures that borderline substantive-procedural rules receive the 
benefit of the presumption against preemption. When state courts are 
adjudicating federal claims, it is fairly obvious that federal substantive 
law controls. Conversely, rules that may be categorized as procedural 
deserve more careful consideration—this is so because non-outcome-
determinative rules generally should not be preempted.
96
 It can hardly 
be said that a rule that has no bearing on the ultimate disposition of 
the case
97
 is in direct conflict with the federal claim. Under those 
circumstances, the presumption against preemption takes hold, to be 
rebutted only by the presence of a policy “of such particular federal 
importance that its effectuation would only be impeded by state 
regulatory involvement.”
98
 For rules that really regulate procedure, 
there is little likelihood that the federal government will have any 
particular interest in the way states operate their court systems. 
 
95 See infra Figure 3. 
96 See Bowermaster, supra note 93, at 9–10. 
97 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
98 See Sharpe, supra note 50, at 176. 
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FIGURE 3. Reverse-Erie Doctrine as It Should Be 
 
An illustration of Felder under the proposed framework shows the 
protections afforded to the states by this approach. In the absence of 
an express preemption clause, the Court would have begun by 
deciding whether the notice-of-claim statute was outcome-
determinative. Had the court arrived at the correct answer under this 
step, it would have found strong countervailing considerations in the 
state’s interest in minimizing liability,
99
 as well as no direct conflict 
because the plaintiff could have easily complied with both the notice 
requirement and § 1983 simultaneously.
100
 Even given the Court’s 
erroneous finding that the notice of claim statute was outcome-
determinative,
101
 the Court would have struggled to articulate what 
critical federal policy the notice-of-claim statute was preventing from 
being executed. With so many barriers to displacing state law, the 
proposed framework likely would have prevented federal supremacy 
from overwhelming the analysis in Felder. Further illustration will 
also show that the proposed framework is the best way for correcting 
 
99 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 143 (1988). 
100 See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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the defects in most reverse-Erie cases, thereby providing some kind 
of reliable guidance for litigants going forward. 
III 
APPLICATIONS THROUGH INDIAN LAW 
Indian law is a particularly interesting vehicle for analyzing 
adjudication of federal claims in state court. The judicial preference 
towards federal law is particularly evident in the context of Indian 
affairs, where the federal government is thought to have particular 
expertise and sensitivity. Broad federal authority over Indian affairs, 
derived from the Indian Commerce Clause
102
 and the federal 
government’s power to make treaties,
103
 leaves little room for state 
regulation. In his 1832 Worcester v. Georgia opinion, Chief Justice 
Marshall decreed that Native American Indian tribes were wholly 
distinct nations within whose boundaries “the laws of [a state] can 
have no force.”
104
 
Given the disadvantages that Native Americans have historically 
faced in our justice system,
105
 and in light of the additional 
safeguards put in place by the federal government for protection of 
those litigants, it is especially important that tribal members be able to 
predict their likelihood of success in court. To begin, the following 
section brings to light some special considerations in displacing state 
law when it comes to Native Americans. Next, through examination 
of several Indian law cases, this section illustrates the mistakes made 
by state courts under the current reverse-Erie framework. Applying 
the proposed framework to those cases, however, will demonstrate the 
benefits that can be achieved by application of a consistent framework 
that produces predictable results for all litigants. 
 
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
103 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
104 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). 
105 See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974) (stating that “the unique 
legal status of Indian tribes under federal law . . . . singles Indians out as a proper subject 
for [legislation] separate” from statutes forbidding discrimination on the basis of race); 
Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Application of Voting Rights Act to Native Americans, 
40 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1 (2009) (discussing the inapplicability of anti-voting discrimination 
laws to Native Americans prior to 1975); Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy 
Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century 
Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 775 (1997) (“Native 
Americans’ efforts to vindicate their free exercise rights in federal court have generally 
been unsuccessful.”). 
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A. Special Status of Tribal Nations Under Federal and State Law 
Due to the sovereign history of tribal nations and their treaties with 
the United States, Native Americans enjoy special treatment under the 
law in several ways that might be relevant to the reverse-Erie 
analysis. Barriers to application of state law to Indian reservations and 
tribal members generally fall into two categories: the right to tribal 
self-government and federal preemption.
106
 Either standing alone is a 
sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable.
107
 However, it 
should be noted that the two bases often overlap because the right of 
tribal self-government is ultimately authorized by Congress
108
 and 
tribal sovereignty often serves as a “backdrop” for informing 
congressional intent behind vague or ambiguous federal 
enactments.
109
 
First, the legislative history behind several statutes indicates a 
congressional intent to protect tribal self-governance from intrusions 
by the states.
110
 Within tribal country, tribes are entitled to fashion 
and enforce their own law.
111
 State law is generally inapplicable to 
on-reservation conduct involving only tribal members since the state’s 
regulatory interest is minimal and the federal interest in encouraging 
tribal self-government is relatively strong.
112
 Both on and off the 
reservation, the doctrine of sovereign immunity insulates tribes from 
liability. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court noted that that while 
“Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with . . . or to limit” 
sovereign immunity, “Congress has consistently reiterated its 
approval of the immunity doctrine.”
113
 As such, states have minimal 
power to regulate the governance of Indian country.
114
 
Additionally, because of the “unique historical origins of tribal 
sovereignty,” the Supreme Court has applied a different standard of 
 
106 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). 
107 Id. at 143. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 144 (citing McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 
(1973)). 
110 See, e.g., McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 176–77. 
111 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 362, (2001) (citing Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980)). 
112 See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 
U.S. 463, 480–481 (1976). 
113 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 
505, 509–10 (1991). 
114 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362. 
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preemption to federal statutes regulating Indian tribes than it has to 
other federal laws.
115
 Motivated by a policy to protect Indian tribes 
from incursions by the states, the Supreme Court has “rejected a 
narrow focus on congressional intent to pre-empt [sic] state law.”
116
 
Instead, the Court engages in “particularized inquiry into the nature of 
the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake.”
117
 Courts determining 
the state’s exercise of jurisdiction over Indian country must consider 
that “[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-empted [sic] by the operation of federal 
law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests 
reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient 
to justify the assertion of state authority.”
118
 As part of the scheme to 
construe preemption broadly in Indian law cases, the Supreme Court 
announced in Bryan v. Itasca County that statutes passed for the 
benefit of Indians are to be construed in favor of Indians.
119
 
B. Reverse-Erie As It Should Be Through the Lens of Indian Law 
The two Indian law cases discussed below—coincidentally both 
from Oregon—illustrate the defects in the current reverse-Erie 
scheme and how unpredictable choices of law can be particularly 
devastating to Native American litigants. By way of background, 
Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
120
 in 1978 to 
give tribes a strong voice in child custody proceedings when Indian 
children are involved.
121
 The legislative history indicates a strong 
federal interest in keeping Indian children with their tribes and 
families,
122
 as will become important in the following cases. Though 
it is usually state interests that are overlooked in reverse-Erie, the 
following cases exhibit situations in which federal and tribal interests 
 
115 See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). 
116 New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983). 
117 Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145. 
118 Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 334. 
119 Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); see also McClanahan v. Ariz. State 
Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (discussing statutory construction in light of the 
“Indian sovereignty doctrine”). 
120 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006). 
121 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 38 n.12 (1989) (citing 25 
U.S.C. § 1914 (1988)). 
122 “One of the effects of our national paternalism has been to so alienate some Indian 
[parents] from their society that they abandon their children at hospitals or to welfare 
departments rather than entrust them to the care of relatives in the extended family. 
Another expression of it is the involuntary, arbitrary, and unwarranted separation of 
families.” House Report, at 12, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, at 7534. 
VAN WIEREN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/4/2012  2:17 PM 
320 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 297 
are ignored. Nevertheless, the proposed framework is helpful for 
reconciling a variety of defects, including where: (1) the court looks 
only to preemption, and finding weak federal interests in procedural 
rules, applies state law; and (2) failing to recognize any conflict 
between the state and federal interests, the court applies the law of the 
forum. 
1. Procedural Rules Not Preempted 
Under one scenario, premature preemption analysis leads to an 
erroneous finding that a seemingly procedural state rule is not 
preempted. In State ex rel. Juvenile Department v. England, the Court 
found that in defining “legal custody,” the state’s plain meaning rule 
was not preempted.
123
 Under the ICWA, an “Indian custodian,” 
defined as “any Indian person who has legal custody of an Indian 
child under tribal law or custom or under [s]tate law or to whom 
temporary physical care, custody, and control has been transferred by 
the parent of such child,”
124
 is entitled to notice of hearings to 
terminate foster care.
125
 Under Oregon’s plain meaning rule, 
petitioner was not entitled to notice because she had not been granted 
“legal custody” under Oregon state law.
126
 Conversely, under the 
federal canon construing “statutes passed for the benefit of Indians     
. . . in favor of Indians,”
127
 petitioner, the aunt of an Indian child to 
whom care had been transferred by the state,
128
 may have been 
entitled to notice. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the state’s 
plain meaning rule was not preempted because, on the face of the 
statute itself, Congress had left determination of “legal custody” up to 
state law and thus preemption was not clearly intended by 
Congress.
129
 
Contrary to the majority’s reasoning, proper application of reverse-
Erie would seem to suggest that the statutory construction rule was 
both substantive and subject to preemption. Aside from the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s circular reasoning regarding preemption—that the 
 
123 State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. England, 640 P.2d 608, 613 (1982). 
124 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6) (2006). 
125 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (2006). 
126 England, 640 P.2d at 612–13. 
127 Id. at 615 (Tongue, J., dissent) (quoting Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 
(1976)). 
128 Id. at 609. 
129 Id. at 613. But see Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44 (“[T]he purpose of the ICWA gives no 
reason to believe that Congress intended to rely on state law for the definition of a critical 
term . . . .”). 
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plain meaning of the statute dictates that the plain meaning rule is not 
preempted—imposition of the proposed framework on England 
reflects that application of federal, not state statutory construction, 
was more desirable in this case. In the absence of consensus on 
whether statutory construction amounts to substance or procedure,
130
 
the Oregon Supreme Court in England would have been well advised 
to begin their analysis with reverse-Erie. It seems clear that in this 
circumstance, the choice of statutory methodologies would have 
indeed affected the ultimate disposition of petitioner’s case; thus, the 
rule was outcome-determinative. Moving on to the balancing test, the 
court failed to articulate a state interest at play behind its plain 
meaning rule—to the contrary, the court articulated a federal interest 
in protecting transfers to extended family members.
131
 Traveling 
down the reverse-Erie route alone seems to point obviously to 
application of federal law, but even a detour into obstacle preemption 
supports the same result. As Justice Tongue stated in his dissent, the 
plain meaning rule and its effects conflict with the remedial nature of 
ICWA and Congressional objectives to protect Indian children from 
being separated from their families and tribal members.
132
 Especially 
considering the relaxed standards for preemption in the Indian law 
context,
133
 the Oregon Supreme Court erred by finding that the state 
rule was not preempted. 
2. Rules of the Forum Applied Where Conflict Unrecognized 
In a second scenario, a failure to recognize a choice-of-law issue 
results in indiscriminate application of state rules. In Quinn v. 
Walters, failure to recognize a reverse-Erie or preemption issue led to 
the application of state rules of evidence to an ICWA claim.
134
 In 
Quinn, a birth mother moved to dismiss an adoption proceeding under 
the ICWA after signing an irrevocable consent to adoption under 
Oregon law.
135
 The birth mother was not a member of the Cherokee 
Indian Tribe at the time of the child’s birth and signed an affidavit 
 
130 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” 
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011) (arguing that courts’ failure to 
recognize statutory construction as “law” exempts interpretation methodologies that ought 
to be considered under Erie and reverse-Erie from the substantive-procedural inquiry). 
131 England, 640 P.2d at 612; see also id. at 616 (Tongue, J., dissenting). 
132 Id. at 616–17. 
133 See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text. 
134 Quinn v. Walters, 881 P.2d 795 (1994). 
135 Id. at 797–98. 
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stating as such,
136
 but later presented a letter from the tribe’s registrar 
that she had enrolled in the tribe and that her child was also eligible 
for membership.
137
 The case then hinged on whether the child was an 
“Indian child” entitled to the protections under ICWA.
138
 Without 
identifying a choice-of-law issue, the Oregon Supreme Court 
employed Oregon’s evidentiary rules and statutory construction 
method and found that the registrar’s record was inadmissible hearsay 
and that there was otherwise insufficient evidence to find that the 
child qualified as an “Indian child.”
139
 
In an insightful dissent, Justice Unis argued that the majority had 
allowed a “hypertechnical procedural ruling [to defeat] substantive 
rights recognized by Congress belonging to a birth mother, a child, 
and an Indian tribe.”
140
 Justice Unis proposed that application of “the 
rules of evidence to this case as if it were a typical adversary 
proceeding . . . reaches a result that is contrary to the purpose and 
spirit of the ICWA,”
141
 unduly restricted the litigant’s opportunity to 
assert her federal claim, and therefore should have been displaced by 
the federal standard of making a pretrial inquiry into the child’s 
Indian status.
142
 Throughout both choice-of-law analyses, Justice 
Unis referred to the tribal and congressional interests in uniform 
adjudication of ICWA.
143
 Ultimately, the dissent found that federal 
and tribal interests in “‘having [Indian] children remain with or 
become a part of the tribe’” outweighed the state’s interest in defining 
its own rules of evidence.
144
 
Imposition of the proposed framework on Quinn v. Walters reveals 
reasoning and results strikingly similar to Justice Unis’s dissent. 
Beginning with reverse-Erie, the application of state hearsay rules 
was indeed outcome-determinative, but most likely implicated the 
same countervailing considerations (administration of the sovereign’s 
courts) articulated in the landmark case of Byrd.
145
 Under the 
proposed framework, rules—like the state evidence rules at issue in 
 
136 Id. at 798. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 799. 
139 Id. at 799–800. 
140 Id. at 805 (Unis, J., dissenting). 
141 Id. at 809. 
142 Id. at 812. 
143 Id. at 806. 
144 Id. at 809 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 23–24 (1978)). 
145 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
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Quinn—that are adjudged to be procedural under the reverse-Erie 
route are unlikely to be displaced in favor of federal law. 
Nevertheless, the presence of an important federal policy can rebut 
the presumption against preemption. Here, that critical federal 
interest, properly considered in reference to tribal self-governance
146
 
and the tripartite Bracker test,
147
 was identified by Justice Unis as the 
interest in keeping Indian children with their tribes. Where application 
of the state rule frustrates that critical interest, as it did here, state 
rules must fall in favor of federal procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
While reverse-Erie has proven to be a more intrusive doctrine than 
its more well-known counterpart, its basic similarities to Erie have 
provided both the solution to that doctrine’s most troublesome defects 
and some comfort regarding the lack of education law students and 
practitioners receive on the merits of this doctrine.
148
 Though the 
Supreme Court has supplied a framework for deciding the 
applicability of federal law in state court, that framework is a faulty—
and perhaps unnecessary—one. All we must know is that, whatever 
the conflict, the test boils down to a balancing test. Where rules that 
“really regulate procedure” are at issue, a presumption in favor of the 
forum’s rule is created, which can then be rebutted by strong 
countervailing policies. By perpetuating these universal principles, 
courts may create the necessary certainty in litigation to encourage 
access to justice for even those litigants who are most disadvantaged. 
  
 
146 See supra notes 110, 112 and accompanying text. 
147 Considerations of preemption should account for the interests of the state, the 
federal government, and the tribe. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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